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R2P and Intervention after Libya 
John W. Dietrich, Bryant University 
 
Abstract: In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS) released a report arguing that states and the 
international community have a responsibility to protect (R2P) citizens 
from major human rights violations and war crimes. The coming years 
saw much discussion of the concept and supportive votes at the U.N., but 
there was little practical implementation. In 2011, world events and U.N. 
action breathed new life into R2P.  Libya was the first case of the U.N. 
using R2P to authorize the use of force against an existing state to protect 
civilians. Debates over Libya before the authorization of force, and 
discussions of the mission both as it continued and afterward show that 
there remain deep divisions within the international community over key 
issues in authorizing and implementing R2P intervention.For an emerging 
norm, perhaps the only thing worse than being ignored is being 
implemented in a way that reinforces old fears and raises new 
controversies. The Libyan case already has shaped discussions of possible 
action in Syria. R2P has been dealt a severe setback, so it will not emerge 
as a meaningful new norm, will not serve as the justification of new 
interventions, and may in some cases actually delay the adoption of less 
coercive responses to human rights violations. 
 
1. Introduction 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, the international 
community was struggling with the challenge of reconciling 
the core concepts of state sovereignty and protection of 
human rights.  In 2001, the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), a panel of 
international experts chaired by Gareth Evans and 
Mohammed Sahnoun, released a report arguing that states 
have a responsibility to protect (R2P) their citizens from 
major human rights violations and war crimes.  If a state 
fails to meet this responsibility, the international community 
should be prepared to take action to protect citizens.  R2P 
quickly drew major international attention and debate.  A 
version of R2P language was adopted at the U.N.’s 2005 
World Summit and theU.N. Security Council indicated 
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support for some R2P language in Resolution 1674 in 2006.  
R2P seemed to be moving rapidly through the norm life-cycle 
identified by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) beginning with 
norm emergence, followed by a norm cascade as states and 
international organizations accept the norm, heading toward 
internalization when states are guided by the norm, and into 
full customary international law.  Subsequent years, though, 
revealed that many countries had not fully accepted key R2P 
concepts, that its language had been watered down as it 
progressed from ICISS report to U.N. statements, and that, 
most crucially, it was not being implemented to address 
ongoing human rights cases in Sudan, Sri Lanka, Somalia 
and elsewhere.  Academics and policymakers began to 
question whether R2P would ever become more than just a 
nice slogan (Evans 2008b; Hehir 2010; Reinold 2010).  These 
discussions highlight that one of the worst things for an 
emerging norm is for it to be ignored. 
 
In 2011, world events and U.N. action breathed new life 
into R2P.  The concept was employed in Cote d’Ivoire and 
then, more dramatically, in Libya.  Libya was the first case of 
the U.N. using R2P to authorize the use of force against an 
existing state to protect civilians.  Supporters of the 
concepthailed the actions as an important next step in 
moving the world from words to actions.  Evans, for example, 
argued that at the outset Libya was “a textbook case of the 
RtoP norm working exactly as it was supposed to” (Evans 
2011).In article entitled “End of the Argument,” Evans 
further argued that there was now “overwhelming 
consensus” on at least the main principles of R2P (Evans 
2011b). 
 
Over time, though, it has become apparent that the 
debates over Libya before the authorization of force, and 
discussions of the mission both as it continued and 
afterward show that there remain deep divisions over key 
issues.  Three of these key issues center on the decision to 
authorize an intervention and reflect issues that have been 
contentious for decades:1) countries continue to disagree 
over how much weight should be given to sovereignty;2) the 
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vagueness of R2P criteria lead some countries to fear that 
decisions of when and where to intervene will always reflect 
political considerations as much as humanitarian issues; 3) 
questions remain over which groups can properly authorize 
an R2P intervention and what to do when the U.N. Security 
Council is deadlocked.  The Libya case also moved R2P from 
theory into action and thus showedthree issues of proper 
implementation that previously had received less attention, 
but reinforced divisions in the international 
community:1)which forces should carry out the intervention 
on behalf of the international community?2)what should be 
the political and military goals of the intervention?  3) what 
responsibility does the international community have after 
an R2P intervention?  These discussions about Libya show 
that, for an emerging norm, perhaps the only thing worse 
than being ignored is being implemented in a way that 
reinforces old fears and raises new controversies. 
 
The full impact of the Libyan case on R2P may not be 
known for years since the passage of time can lead to 
different conclusions than immediate analysis, and because 
interventions are often judged by their long-term outcomes 
and Libya’s future still remains uncertain.  In the short term, 
though, the Libyan case has dealt a severe blow to R2P and 
complicated international responses to violence.The limited 
influence of post-Libya R2P can be seen in international 
responses to early violence in Syria.  The Syrian situation 
has continued to progress to become a multi-factional civil 
war far beyond what R2P was designed to address, so the 
focus is really why little action was taken in 2011 or early 
2012 before the situation spiraled. 
 
Supporters will point out that R2P includes preventative 
aspects and that military action is not the only form of 
intervention,but R2P really cannot be fully separated from 
forceful humanitarian intervention.  First, the whole concept 
stemmed from an effort to address the challenges of 
humanitarian intervention.  Second, interventions draw 
public attention and focus policymakers’ debates in different 
ways than prevention or less dramatic interventions, so 
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forceful interventions will shape overall perceptions of 
R2Pand likely influence the level of global support for other 
aspects of R2P.  Therefore, although R2P is not a synonym 
for humanitarian intervention, the concepts are so 
interwoven that supporters must address many of the same 
challenges that limited support for humanitarian 
intervention.  This is why almost all observers, both 
supporters and critics, recognized that the first major R2P 
intervention would be a shaping event for the norm’s 
future.The term will likely continue to be used in coming 
years in relation to preventative and other actions, but these 
actions could have been taken in any case, so R2P may be 
changing the terms of discussion, but it is not creating any 
significant new action. 
 
On the key issue ofinternational interventions, R2P is 
quite weak after the Libya case.  In coming years, it will not 
emerge as a meaningful new norm, will not serve as the 
justification of new interventions, and may in some cases 
actually delay the adoption of less coercive responses to 
human rights violations.This leaves the international 
community much where it was at the turn of the century in 
trying to weigh political and practical challenges against 
desires to end mass violations of human rights.  It is, 
therefore, useful to trace a little history before examining the 
six issues raised by R2P and how they played out in the 
Libyan case. 
 
2. Developing R2P 
 
The modern idea of humanitarian intervention first rose 
to prominence in the 1990s as the end of the Cold War 
increased the chance for global cooperation, shifted focus to 
regional issues, but also saw the outbreak of new intra-state 
conflicts.  The U.N. authorized actions in Somalia and 
Bosnia in 1992. Neither mission was a full success and the 
U.N.’s inaction in Rwanda in 1994 seemed to confirm that, 
although there was some desire to protect civilians and 
others from abuses,it often was outweighed by major 
political and practical barriers to successful intervention.  
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The latter half of the 1990s saw leadership of interventions 
shift more toward regional groups and actors. For example, 
West African forces intervened in Sierra Leone and Liberia, 
U.S. forces in Haiti, and Australian forces in East Timor.  
This trend to regional groups was highlighted by NATO 
actions in Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999.  These 
regional actions proved more coordinated and forceful than 
the U.N. actions, but raised the crucial issue of whether 
intervention without U.N. approval was illegal.  In the 
famous words of the Independent International Commission 
on Kosovo, NATO’s intervention was “illegal but legitimate” 
(Independent, 2000, 4). 
 
In developed countries, this wave of interventions led to 
debates over when countries should act outside of their 
national interests to protect civilians in other countries and 
what resources and sacrifices were justifiable in such cases.  
Less developed countries (LDCs) were frequently more 
critical of the interventions.  In a famous piece, Mohammed 
Ayoobargued that LDCs saw the interventionsas a violation 
of state sovereignty, a new form of Western imperialism, and 
driven by double standards in that Western countries and 
allies were immune from focus (2004).Anotherscholar 
summarized sentiment saying, “at the turn of the century, it 
has become clear that the concept of HI [humanitarian 
intervention] has no future; that it is not acceptable to the 
majority of U.N. member states” (Gierycz, 2010, 112). 
 
The ICISS 2001 report and other efforts to develop R2P 
attempted to move away from the terms and specific policies 
of humanitarian intervention, but continue to build on the 
sentiment that international actions should be taken to 
protect civilians.  The focus shifted from a right to intervene 
to a responsibility to protect, and from a focus on sovereignty 
granting control to “sovereignty as responsibility” (ICISS 
2001).  States retained the prime responsibility for protecting 
their citizens from genocide, mass murder, and ethnic 
cleansing, but if the state was unable or unwilling to meet its 
responsibilities then the principle of non-intervention could 
be set aside and the international community should 
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consider action.  The report argued that intervention should 
be supplemented with policies of prevention and post-conflict 
peace building.  It also argued that military force was only 
one form of intervention. Thus, “The ICISS sandwiched 
military force between the sliced white bread of prevention 
and postconflict peacebuilding. . . [so] the option of military 
intervention to protect human lives became somewhat more 
palatable than it had been, especially in the global South” 
(Weiss 2011, 2). The report also argued that specific 
casesshould be judged usingJust War criteria such as would 
the intervention stop gross violations of rights, was force 
reserved as a last resort, and did the intervention have a 
reasonable prospect of success.  The ICISS placed primary 
responsibility for authorization in the U.N. Security Council, 
but suggested that the five permanent members agree to not 
use their veto power unless vital national interests were at 
stake.  Furthermore, a deadlocked Security Council could be 
addressed by going to the General Assembly or regional 
groups. 
 
R2P was explicitly endorsed in two paragraphs of the 
U.N.’s 2005 World Summit Outcomes Document.  This 
inclusion was a victory for R2P supporters, but, because it 
came after several years of questions and criticisms being 
raised, several compromises were made that weakened the 
concept compared to the ICISS report.  The result was “R2P 
lite” (Weiss 2007, 117).  Authorization was put firmly back in 
the Security Council’s hands, but the idea of limiting vetoes 
was rejected by China, Russia, and the United States.  The 
Just War criteria were not formally included in U.N. 
statements.  Protection would occur in cases of genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleaning and crimes against humanity, 
but there was no further clarification on the required level of 
these threats, and the need for intervention was to be judged 
on a case-by-case basis.  The threshold for a state failing to 
meet its responsibilities was raised to “manifest failure.”  
There also was no stated obligation to act, only a call for 
preparation to take action. 
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Even with the weakened language, subsequent years saw 
a degree of “buyer’s remorse” among certain states that 
further weakened R2P implementationfollowing the 2005 
World Summit (Evans 2008, 288).  Several states such as 
Algeria, Brazil, and Egypt argued that the 2005 agreement 
called for further study and debate, rather than immediate 
implementation.  Key countries, including Russia and China, 
renewed concerns about sovereignty and non-intervention.  
In 2006, Security Council Resolution 1674 broadly 
supported R2P, but only after the resolution was watered 
down to just reaffirming the 2005 wording.  In subsequent 
years, criticisms and back-sliding continued and there were 
no cases of authorized R2P intervention. 
 
Overall, R2P’s development shows that several important 
issues, discussed in more detail below, remain.  
Compromises were made to move the process along.  These 
compromises weakened R2P from the ICISS vision, yet were 
not been enough to quell critics.  Most countries had agreed 
to R2P in broad principle, but it remained up to each 
country to define what that meant in practice.  To move R2P 
forward, some academic supporters and UN officials sought 
to distance R2P from humanitarian intervention and focus 
more on prevention (Bellamy 2009).  These prevention efforts 
certainly have merit, but R2P really cannot be fully 
separated from forceful humanitarian intervention and the 
challenges that brings.  
 
3.1 Sovereignty 
 
Over the last century, there has been a growing 
development of international norms and laws protecting 
individual human rights.  This movement always has had to 
deal with the issue of how to balance the state’s right of 
sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs with the 
individuals’ rights.  This issue is of course dramatically 
highlighted by cases of humanitarian intervention directly 
aimed at changing state behavior and, in many cases, 
seeking regime change.  Concerns over sovereignty were 
central to many developing countries’ worries in the 1990s 
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and the development of R2P has brought back those same 
worries.  Additionally, R2P has sought to redefine sovereignty 
and alter existing notions of its benefits and obligations. 
 
Issues of sovereignty and non-interference are commonly 
raised by LDCs.  Ayoob has argued that these countries are 
particularly sensitive to the loss of sovereignty because they 
have only just achieved independence from colonialism 
(2004).  The memory of colonialism also makes them 
sensitive to the idea of Great Powers interfering in domestic 
politics.  Further, their state of development may make them 
worry that they will be targeted for intervention.  Many 
developing countries have multiple ethnic groups, so there is 
a chance of ethnic violence.  Many are weaker states that 
may be challenged by internal groups and feel the need to 
use repression and violence to keep order.  Many European 
states had violent pasts, but today the rules have shifted and 
internal violence risks international intervention. 
 
During the 1990s, developing countries repeatedly 
opposed interventions on the grounds that they violated 
sovereignty.  In 2000, the South Summit of 122 states 
rejected “the so-called ‘right’ of humanitarian intervention 
which has no legal basis in the United Nations Charter or in 
the general principles of international law” (Gierycz 2010, 
125).  India, Brazil, South Africa and other leading LDCs 
have, at times, expressed similar feelings.  In 2001 
discussions of the R2P report, the Chinese delegation 
argued, “the assertion of ‘human rights transcending 
sovereignty’ has serious fallacies in theory and lends no help 
to the legalization of humanitarian intervention” (Ayoob, 
2004, 108).  Importantly, Russia has voiced similar views, so 
two veto-wielding powers often seek to defend the existing 
concept of strong sovereignty. 
 
R2P reframed the sovereignty issue, but reactions have 
been similar to humanitarian intervention.  In 2005, India’s 
ambassador argued that discussions of R2P must not be 
allowed to confer legitimacy on a right of intervention.  The 
Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 
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observed there were “similarities” between R2P and 
humanitarian intervention and reasserted that there was no 
right to intervention (Bellamy 112).  Ayoob has again warned 
that the Great Powers are creating legal justifications for the 
interventions they always desired (Ayoob 2002). It should be 
noted that the LDCs are not united in opposition as many 
countries in Africa and Latin America have expressed 
support for the R2P concept or for particular actions. 
 
To some observers, raising issues of sovereignty may 
conjure an image of an abusive dictator hiding behind a legal 
curtain, but it must be remembered that sovereignty has 
been a bedrock principle of international law for centuries, 
referenced by the powerful as well as the weak, the good as 
well as the bad, so alterations in the definition must be 
carefully considered by the international community as a 
whole.  R2P’s logic that sovereignty brings certain 
responsibilities builds off the work of U.N. advisors Roberta 
Cohen and Francis Deng (Cohen and Deng 1998).  
International legal terms are flexible and develop through 
usage, but it is unrealistic to expect that the entire 
international community would shift its understanding of a 
centuries-old core principle within just a few years.  If 
countries do not accept the redefinition, then the sovereignty 
discussion will play out much like it has for decades and few 
R2P interventions will be authorized.  These views were 
nicely captured by the Head of Mission of amajor G77 
country when he noted, “The concept of responsibility to 
protect does not exist except in the minds of the Western 
imperialists” (Evans 2008, 55). 
 
From the above discussion, it is noteworthy, and probably 
surprising to some doubters, that in the Libyan case the 
U.N. did authorize the use of all means necessary to protect 
civilians.  This shows sovereignty concerns can be overcome, 
but Libya was a highly unusual situation, furthermore the 
actions taken in Libya reinforced LDC worries, so a repeat 
elsewhere is far from guaranteed.   
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In early discussions of Libya, several countries resisted 
the use of force or even sanctions.  Russia and China led 
calls for a ceasefire and internal Libyan solution, and were 
supported by India, Brazil and Germany.  Eventual, forceful 
action in Libya was driven by a number of factors.  First, 
conditions for civilians continued to worsen and a massacre 
of civilians appeared imminent.  Gaddafihad directly 
threatened to kill civilians who opposed him.  Second, 
Gaddafi did not have good relations with many regional 
leaders and Libya did not have major ties to either Russia or 
China.  Third, several regional organizations called for 
intervention, so it became easier for Russia and China, but 
also the United States, to say that they were following the 
will of the community.  Rarely will these factors all come 
together again. 
 
Even with the factors supporting intervention, Resolution 
1973 explicitly rejected “a foreign occupation force of any 
form on any part of Libyan territory.”  Enforcing a no-fly zone 
would affect sovereignty, but in a less direct way.  The 
Resolution passed 10-0, with Russia, China, India, Brazil 
and Germany all abstaining.  The abstentions show that 
many significant international actors did not fully accepted 
R2P’s challenge to sovereignty.  Those abstaining cited their 
long-standing views on non-intervention and preference for a 
political solution, but by that point the political pressure not 
to block action was significant, so they chose to abstain not 
veto.   
 
3.2 Lack of Criteria and Politicization  
 
International norms and customary law always allow a 
degree of interpretation and thus can be flexible to meet 
particular circumstances.  The downside of flexibility is that 
political calculations may shape interpretation leading to 
inconsistent application of laws across time and across 
cases.  This inconsistency leads to claims of political 
agendas and double standards.  The 1990s interventions 
were particularly susceptible to these accusations because 
there was neither an accepted legal definition of 
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humanitarian intervention nor established criteria for action.  
There were frequent complaints that Western allies, 
particularly Israel, were given a free pass, while enemies of 
the West faced international action.  There also was a feeling 
that problems in Yugoslavia and Haiti were addressed 
quickly because they were geographically close to major 
powers, while much worse problems in African countries 
were allowed to continue. 
 
The language adopted at the 2005 World Summit, 
reinforced by the Security Council, moved R2P beyond 
humanitarian intervention in establishing a politically and 
legally binding set of standards (Gierycz).  The R2P 
standards are, though, intentionally vague on a number of 
points.  Countries must protect their citizens, but there are 
no firm guidelines for when a state has crossed the line.  
This vagueness will inevitably trigger political battles--one 
need only think of the many disputes over what constitutes 
genocide that have occurred even after acceptance of the 
1948 Conventionon the Prevention and Punishmentofthe 
Crime of Genocide.  Second, international action should 
come when states are “manifestly failing to protect their 
populations.”  Again, there will be debate over when such a 
condition exists.  Third, the international community has the 
“responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian 
and other peaceful means,” and only consider force “should 
peaceful means be inadequate.”  These ideas follow the Just 
War principle of last resort, but could allow for long debates 
about whether peaceful means have been exhausted.  For all 
of these reasons, R2P is left as a case-by-case decision and 
one that carries no legal obligation to act.  This lack of 
specificity is intentional.  It is favored by countries wary of 
R2P who do not want to give it further legitimacy with set 
standards, but it is also favored by the Great Powers who do 
not want to have their political options reduced.  This leaves 
the world with little more clarity than existed with 
humanitarian intervention.  Thus, complaints of 
inconsistency are sure to reemerge. 
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As previously mentioned, in the Libyan case, several key 
countries favored continued political pressure and 
negotiation rather than force.  If Gaddafi had shown a true 
interest in meeting with foreign negotiators and had made 
some strategic concessions, he potentially could have 
delayed or prevented action, much as Sudan has done in the 
case of Darfur.  The fact that action was taken in Libya then 
opens the question of why there was no equivalent action in 
Bahrain, or Yemen where the Western countries have 
stronger political ties.  The perceived Western bias of R2P 
was highlighted just days after the U.N. authorized force, 
when Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin commented, “In 
general, it reminds me of a medieval call for a crusade” (Levy 
and Shanker 2011).  Overall, there is no simple solution to 
the complications brought by vague terms, but that very 
point means that critics will continue to see R2P as a 
selective, political tool. 
 
3.3 Authorization 
 
A major reason why both humanitarian intervention, and 
R2P, has been perceived as politically driven and selective is 
because of the workings of the U.N. Security Council.  The 
Council is a political body, gives major power to the five 
permanent seats, and its voting rules can often end in 
stalemate.  Even with these issues, a vast majority of states 
would rather the U.N. have the authority to authorize R2P 
rather than to allow unilateral action by Great Powers or 
regional groups.  It is therefore a matter of how to make the 
best of an imperfect situation. 
 
The U.N.’s failure to agree on action in Rwanda and 
Kosovo were prominent issues as R2P was being formulated.  
The ICISS argued that all R2P actions should seek Security 
Council approval to reinforce the importance of the U.N. and 
sustain international law.  The ICISS, though, also suggested 
three further points on authorization.  First, permanent 
members should follow a code of conduct under which they 
would not veto R2P actions unless there was a vital national 
interest at stake.  This idea may have intellectual merit, but 
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it was dead on arrival in the real world.  The veto, of course, 
goes back to the founding of the U.N. and was seen as a way 
of enticing the Great Powers into the U.N.  The veto, and the 
threat of a veto, has given the powers major leverage that 
they have never been willing to limit in any previous U.N. 
reform package.  Their view was recently restated by Putin 
who wrote to a Russian and foreign audience, “Let me 
remind you that the veto right is not a whim but an integral 
part of the global system, codified in the U.N. Charter, by the 
way, at the insistence of the United States” (No “Libyan 
scenario” 2012).  The idea of a code was simply dropped as 
discussion of R2P moved forward in the U.N. 
 
The ICISS also suggested that, if the Security Council did 
not act, the issue could be taken to the General Assembly 
through the “Uniting for Peace” resolution.  This resolution 
dates to 1950, when western powers were trying to assure 
that the Soviet Union could not block action aiding South 
Korea.  The resolution states that when the Security Council 
fails to act to maintain international peace and security, the 
General Assembly can issue recommendations.  The 
legitimacy of the resolution is questioned by those who argue 
that it contradicts the Charter’s allocation of duties, plus the 
legal weight of General Assembly resolutions is minimal.  In 
any case, for R2P, any potential General Assembly role was 
negated by the 2005 World Summit document thatdirectly 
reaffirmed the Security Council as the legitimate forum for 
authorization. 
 
The ICISS further noted that in cases of Security Council 
inaction, concerned states may still wish to act.  They 
discouraged unilateral action, given fears of political motives 
and a further weakening of the U.N., but suggested that 
there could be actions by regional groups and retrospective 
legitimacy given by Security Council approval.  Interestingly, 
the Libyan case shows regional groups playing a different 
role, not as independent actors, but as “gatekeepers” for U.N. 
action (Bellamy 2011, 841).  On March 7, the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) called on the Security Council to 
use all means necessary to protect civilians.  The 
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Organization of Islamic Countries issued a similar 
statement, but with direct emphasis that no foreign ground 
troops should be involved.  The African Union was more 
cautious as it criticized Libya, but did not call for forceful 
intervention.  The key group, though, was the League of Arab 
States (LAS).  The LAS called for a no-fly zone and 
establishment of protected safe areas for civilians.  The LAS 
statement help tip the United States to support the use of 
force.  It also made it more difficult for Russia and China to 
oppose the use of force, although they still could use the 
threat of a veto to keep the force’s mandate limited. 
 
With the code of conduct and General Assembly ideas 
removed, R2P authorization rests firmly with the Security 
Council.  In the past, this has allowed China and Russia to 
end discussions of actions in Myanmar and Sri Lanka and to 
modify actions in the Libyan case. Regional groups pushing 
R2P in the Libyan case contributed to action, but 
thisdevelopment raises long-term questions.  If regional 
groups act as gatekeepers, can they veto operations they 
oppose? Can they ever pressure the U.N. to take actions that 
the Great Powers oppose?  There also are questions of what 
group should be considered the true spokesperson for a 
region.  R2P thus will either have to move forward with a 
highly political and divided U.N., or with a complicated and 
likely controversial multi-tiered authorization system.  These 
are not problems for R2P alone, but since these same 
problems about authorizing action on other issues have not 
generated significant U.N. reform, it is unlikely that R2P will. 
 
3.4 Whose Forces and Decisions 
 
Over its first decade, R2P remained largely a theoretical 
concept, so most discussion centered on questions of 
triggering actions.  Now, more attention needs to be focused 
on implementation issues.  A leading concern here comes 
from another U.N. structural issue, namely that there is no 
U.N. army or standing peacekeeping force.  Some R2P 
actions may be delayed, or even never implemented, if no 
countries are willing to volunteer their forces and material.  
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Further, U.N. forces will be weak if they are drawn mainly 
from LDC armies.  As of 2011, the ten top troop-contributing 
countries for peacekeeping were Bangladesh, Pakistan,India, 
Nigeria,Ethiopia, Nepal, Egypt, Jordan, Rwanda, and Ghana.  
Some of these countries have highly regarded troops, but the 
lack of major power involvement is still a problem if R2P 
missions are to be successful. 
 
In cases where major powers do volunteer forces, the 
larger problem becomes that those countries will then expect 
to make the decisions on military tactics and goals.  This 
further politicizes the action and raises the risk that there 
will be a mismatch between the original authorizing 
resolution and actions taken on the ground.  For example, 
the initial stages of 1992 intervention in Somalia involved 
almost exclusively U.S. troops.  The mission therefore was 
seen by some as a U.S. intervention, with U.N. cover.  In 
time, other countries’ troops and officials arrived, and the 
U.N. was given responsibility and authority, but tensions 
then emerged between U.S. and U.N. officials.  There 
remained heavy U.S. influence until U.S. troops were 
removed in 1993, anaction that effectively meant that the 
U.N. needed to end its involvement.  It was therefore largely 
the United States that was making decisions for the 
international community. 
 
In the case of Libya, the U.N. authorized member states 
“acting nationally or through regional organizations” to use 
all means necessary.  England and France led many of the 
initial strikes.  The United States was active, although 
President Obama announced that U.S.troops would quickly 
assume a supporting role focused on intelligence, 
logistics,and search and rescue.  A seniorWhite House 
official noted that Obama always stressed that US 
involvement should be“days, not weeks” (Cooper and Myers 
2011).On March31, formal control of the Libyan mission was 
transferred to NATO. 
 
The shift to NATO control broadened the number of 
countries involved, but still left England, France, and the 
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United States as the military and political leaders.  At 
anApril 14 meeting of Foreign Ministers from NATO Allies 
and non-NATO Partners,the alliance committed to using all 
necessary resources and operational flexibility to meet the 
U.N. mandate until all attacks on civilians and civilian-
populated areas ended, the Libyan government had 
withdrawn all military and para-military forces to bases, and 
the government permitted immediate, full, safe and 
unhindered access to humanitarian aid for the Libyan 
people.  These new goals did not directly contradict the 
original U.N. resolution, but they were a modification and 
showed that the power of decision on specific goals often 
goes to those who advance the troops.  China, Russia, South 
Africa and other soon claimed that NATO was not following 
the U.N. mandated goals, but could do little directly since 
their troops were not involved. 
 
Jonathan Eyal has correctly argued that the move to 
NATO control  
sharpened divisions in the UN, damaged the moral 
authority of the operation in the eyes of doubters and 
confirmed all the conspiracy theories of those who argued 
that R2P is nothing more but a new justification for some 
old-style Western intervention (C, 58). 
If future R2P missions are authorized, careful 
consideration should be given to who will actually lead the 
forces. 
 
Who leads the mission has a large impact on the tactics 
chosen.  In Libya, the first tactics chosen resembled those of 
Kosovo.  Airstrikes again proved to be militarily impressive, 
but an imprecise tactic as both civilians and fighters seeking 
to oust Gadaffi were killed and civilian infrastructure was 
damaged.  NATO forces bombed government forces near 
rebel strongholds, but also support facilities, command 
centers, and government offices.  Within days of Resolution 
1973’s approval, Chinese, Russian and other officials were 
calling for an end to bombing, noting that civilians were 
being killed in a mission designed to protect civilians.  They 
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were later sharply critical of attacks that killed members of 
Gadaffi’s family.  In all, NATO aircraft flew nearly 10,000 
strike missions.  Had foreign ground troops been introduced, 
civilian deaths still would have occurred, but possibly would 
have been reduced, but the idea of ground troops was ruled 
out not on the comparative cost-benefit to civilian protection 
or on military grounds, but rather on political grounds.  
Russia and China would not have supported ground troops 
and Western powers were wary of placing troops in another 
Muslim country.  The issue of blunted tactics became 
increasingly obvious as the war stretched from weeks into 
months and would have become even more glaring had it 
dragged into years of engagement.  Ground troops may not 
be appropriate for every R2P operation, but if they are simply 
taken off the table, R2P will struggle to reach its goal of 
protecting civilians. 
 
A second tactic highlighted by the Libyan case is the 
arming and training of insurgents. Resolution 1973 that 
authorized all means necessary build on Resolution 1970 
passed weeks earlier.  Resolution 1970 established an arms 
embargo on Libya and Resolution 1973 appeared to reinforce 
that policy.  Members of the British Foreign Office, though, 
argued that 1973 allowed for the provision of defensive 
weapons if the weapons would aid the goal of protecting 
civilians (Eyal 2012).  States such as Qatar sent weapons to 
the insurgents with at least the knowledge, if not the active 
support, of NATO officials.  The difficulty of course is that 
once weapons enter a theatre it becomes impossible to 
control their future use.  The insurgents mounted major 
offensives again regime strongholds that placed civilians in 
jeopardy.  Later the U.N. Human Rights Council reported 
that “the thuwar (anti-Qadhafi forces) committed serious 
violations, including war crimes and breaches of 
international human rights law” (U.N. Human Rights 
Council, 2012, 2).  Furthermore, after the war, the arms held 
by various factions have been a major source of instability in 
Libya and the broader region.  These experiences highlight 
several issues.  First, if an R2P mission is supposed to 
protect civilians, it may need to protect them from 
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insurgents as well as from existing regimes.  Second, arming 
factions in the short-term can have complicated and 
uncertain long-term consequences. 
 
The Libyan experience may lead some countries to want 
more explicit military goals and rules of engagement 
included in resolutions.  Requirement for more details, 
though, could further delay approval of resolutions as details 
are explored and debated.  Countries putting their troops at 
risk may then chafe at the idea of others making military 
decisions for their soldiers.  An alternative would be to pass 
resolutions more frequently, so that they can adjust to 
changing circumstances on the ground.  This approach, 
though, would require repeated diplomatic work and would 
risk having missions terminated or significantly altered 
halfway through.  All together, these practical difficulties of 
finding troops and setting tactics reduce the overall 
likelihood of future R2P missions. 
 
3.5 Appropriate Goals 
 
A main goal of humanitarian intervention is to stop 
human rights violations and war crimes.  R2P espouses a 
similar goal of protecting civilians from those crimes.  How 
best to achieve this goal is not always clear.  Outside forces 
could, for example, set up safe havens for civilians or 
establish corridors for humanitarian aid.  There could be 
efforts to negotiate a ceasefire.  There could be more 
dramatic actions to address the violations at their root by 
bringing regime change or defeat of one faction in a civil war. 
These are very different types of actions, so thought should 
be given to which objective is most likely to be necessary and 
the chosen objective should be made clear up front, so that 
those authorizing force understand what they are agreeing to 
do. 
 
In the 1990s, theU.N. favored tactics at the less 
aggressive end of the spectrum in part because this 
lessenedchallenges to sovereignty and increased the chance 
of global support.  Forces were sent in as “impartial” actors.  
   
 
   
   
 
   
   John W. Dietrich, Bryant University    
   
 
   
 
341 
 
Writing about these interventions, Richard Betts has made 
the strong case that impartiality is in fact a “delusion” 
(1994).  Using force always will change the dynamics on the 
ground and thus the political outcome, so it is never fully 
impartial.  Further, Edward N. Luttwak(1999) has argued 
that the steps taken by outside observers at times may 
actually make situations worse in the long-run.  Establishing 
safe havens encourages civilians to stay in a region and thus 
remain in harm’s way if the safe haven fails.  Ceasefires do 
not resolve the underlying political dispute, so violence may 
restart in the future and, in the meantime, forces may 
regroup and rearm so that the second wave of violence is 
worse than the first. 
 
Despite these existing ideas, R2P supporters often implied 
that interventions could be apolitical operations protecting 
civilians while not radically altering local political power.  
The Libya case calls this idea further question as the 
operation’s ultimate goal slid toward regime change.  
Resolution 1973 made no mention of regime change and had 
that idea explicitly been included, it is almost certain the 
resolution would have faced a Russian or Chinese veto.  Just 
days after the resolution, however, leaders such as David 
Cameron of Great Britain, Nicolas Sarkozy of Franceand 
Obamabegan arguing that Gaddafi must be removed from 
leadership as the only way to assure long-term security for 
civilians.  Further, from a practical perspective, the longer 
the fighting continued, the harder it became to imagine any 
result short of Gaddafi’s removal.  If he remained in power, 
there would have been a day when Gaddafi could reignite his 
efforts to crush the opposition.  Also, with the statements of 
key leaders, NATO’s reputation was increasingly tied to 
bringing about regime change. 
 
Not surprisingly, countries wary of any intervention 
sharply opposed the drift toward the goal of regime change.  
In April, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov argued, “The 
U.N. Security Council never aimed to topple the Libyan 
regime. All those who are currently using the U.N. resolution 
for that aim are violating the U.N. mandate” (NATO 2011).  In 
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May 2011, in a Security Council debate on the protection of 
civilians in armed conflict, China bluntly warned that 
“[t]here must be no attempt at regime change ... under the 
guise of protecting civilians (Protection 2011).  Russian, 
Chinese and other diplomats suggested that they had been 
tricked into agreeing to an R2P mission only to see it become 
a regime change mission (Garwood-Gowers 2012).  There 
also was criticism that NATO operations ended almost as 
soon as Gadaffi was captured and killed despite ongoing 
violence in the country. 
 
Academics have argued that the shift from R2P to regime 
change alters the moral legitimacy of the action.  James 
Pattison (2011) argues that Just War theory could support a 
R2P mission in Libya since there were sufficient reasons to 
act and there would be low costs.  However, there was not 
sufficient cause for a Just War of regime change and that 
goal would bring such high costs that “this bar is unlikely to 
have been met in Libya.” 
 
In the wake of the Libyan experience, some observers 
therefore have suggested that the way to rescue R2P is to 
separate it from the controversial idea of regime change 
(Western and Goldstein 2013).The problem with this idea is 
that in many cases, R2P interventions will require regime 
change to be fully effective.  Even those that do not require 
full regime change will need to greatly alter the local political 
balance, since if existing governments were willing and able 
to protect their citizens, they would have taken those steps 
to avoid the intervention.  Saying upfront that regime change 
is necessary or even likely will make missions more 
controversial and less often approved.  Announcing regime 
change only once operations have begun will lead to poorly 
coordinated actions and resentment.  Ultimately, widespread 
international acceptance that certain situations require 
regime change is needed, but such acceptance is unlikely to 
emerge often in today’s political climate, so this is a major 
problem for R2P in the future. 
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3.6 Post-conflict Rebuilding 
 
The ICISS report and subsequent U.N. documents have 
argued that R2P needs to move beyond prevention and 
action to consider rebuilding after interventions.  As the 
report described it: 
Too often in the past the responsibility to rebuild has 
been insufficientlyrecognized, the exit of the interveners 
has been poorly managed, the commitmentto help with 
reconstruction has been inadequate, and countries have 
found themselves atthe end of the day still wrestling with 
the underlying problems that produced the 
originalintervention action (ICISS 2001). 
 
These issues historically have received much less 
academic and policy attention.  Also, frustrations over 
troops' deaths in cases such as Somalia, and over long-term 
commitments with no clear end such as in Bosnia and 
Kosovo, have meant that much of the focus that has been 
given to post-conflict issues has been on developing exit 
strategies that seek to end interventions quickly.  The lack of 
planning and the desire to rush out quickly must be 
reversed if R2P is to prove a long-term benefit. 
 
The ICISS suggested focusing on the key areas of 
security, justice and reconciliation, and development.  
Security requires functioning police and armed forces that 
are loyal to the new government, properly trained, and 
willing to perform the tasks they are assigned.  In many 
cases, security requires disarming and demobilizing factions.  
Justice and reconciliation requires a functioning judicial 
system.  Countries also must consider options of trials, 
truths commissions, or amnesties for those involved in the 
previous government.  Long-term stability requires economic 
development to provide jobs, services, and a viable tax base. 
 
In Libya, NATO operations were ended on October 31, 
2011 less than two weeks after Gadaffi was killed.  An 
interim government and cabinet headed by Prime Minister 
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Dr. Abdurrahim El Keib was formed.  To assist the new 
government, the U.N. authorized the United Nations Support 
Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) in September 2011, but security 
operations were fully in the hands of the interim government 
(Kumar 2012).  Steps have been taken to rebuild the military 
and police forces, but it will take time for them to be seen as 
fully functioning and legitimate.  One major challenge the 
new government faces is disarming the factions and assuring 
control of what once were major and advanced weapons in 
the Libyan military’s arsenal.  The impact of weak 
government control of security was highlighted by the 
September 11, 2012 attack on the American diplomatic 
mission at Benghazi.  The attack was carried out by well-
armed Islamist militants who have gained in powerin the 
vacuum of weak government control.  Weak government 
control of weapons and territory has also affected the region 
as equipment and militants have moved to Algeria, Mali, and 
Chad. 
 
The new government’s efforts at justice began with a 
jarring start when Gaddafi was killed after his capture.  
Other revenge killings occurred, but they did not spiral out 
of control.  The government,therefore,has begun to consider 
establishing a truth commission expressly modeled on those 
in Chile, Argentina and South Africa.  The focus would be on 
fact finding and reconciliation rather than retribution.  
Trials, though, are likely for the leaders of the Gadaffi 
regime.  Again the international world must keep focus on 
Libya so that fair standards are established, and must offer 
it technical assistance when requested. 
 
On July 7, 2012, the National Transitional Council 
supervised democratic elections for a 200 member General 
National Congress to replace the Council.  The assembly was 
to choose a prime minister and organize parliamentary 
elections in 2013.  The process did not proceed smoothly as 
in October 2012, Libya's Prime Minister-elect Mustafa A.G. 
Abushagur stepped downafter failing a second time to win 
parliamentary approval for a new cabinetA process to write a 
constitution will also be determined to be followed by a 
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referendum.  These various moves show progress in 
establishing a new government that can bring security and 
justice, but a stable government with full control of its own 
territory is still years away. 
 
On development, Libya does have an advantage compared 
to many possible R2P cases, namely that its oil and large 
foreign assets provide it with major resources.  Allocating 
those resources in an equitable way is more of a challenge.  
Before the war, income distribution was extremely skewed.  
This reality will not suddenly reverse, so the new government 
will face the challenge of citizens with higher expectations, 
but no immediate prospects for long-term, equitable growth. 
If Libya falls into political instability, violence, or 
economic stagnation, or if it requires major long-term 
international commitments of time and resources, it will be 
harder to convince the international community to support 
future R2P actions. 
4. Libya’s Implications for Syria and Beyond 
 
At the beginning of the intervention in Libya, Obama and 
others stressed that the Libyan case was unusual and 
should not be seen as establishing set criteria and 
expectations for future actions.  The reality, though, is that 
since Libya was the first major use of force for R2P actions, 
this case will have major implications for the norm’s future.  
For those favoring the development of R2P, the very fact of 
action in Libya with U.N. consent is an important milestone.  
However, the operation brought back many of the unresolved 
issues of the past and reinforced many of the critics’ worries.  
It also showed the major challenges of implementation and 
rebuilding that have until now received less attention in 
R2Pdiscussions.  Overall, the use of R2P in Libya has 
decreased the likelihood of actions elsewhere.  As Evans, one 
of the long-term architects of the policy noted, “Consensus 
has collapsed amid recrimination about how the NATO-led 
implementation of the Security Council’s Libya mandate‘to 
protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of 
attack’ was carried out (Philps 2012). 
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As protests and government crackdowns escalated in 
Syria, the Special Advisers of the Secretary-General on the 
Prevention of Genocide and on the Responsibility to Protect 
called “on the international community to take immediate, 
decisive action to meet the responsibility to protect 
populations at further risk of atrocity crimes in Syria, taking 
into consideration the full range of tools available under the 
United Nations Charter” (Statement 2012).  Action, though, 
has been minor and slow as countries consider the realities 
of Syria’s geopolitical realities and the memories of R2P in 
Libya. 
 
Russian officials have been the most explicit about the 
connection of Libya and Syria.  They repeatedly have said 
that they will not accept a “Libya-style” solution for Syria.  
Putin recently wrote, “Learning from that bitter experience, 
we are against any U.N. Security Council resolutions that 
could be interpreted as a signal for military interference in 
the domestic processes of Syria” (“Russia’s Putin” 2012).  
Russia has long-standing ties with Syria, sees those ties as a 
way to keep Russian influence in Middle East discussions, 
continues to sell Syria military supplies, and has a naval 
base in Syria.  Russia’s stance on many issues also has 
toughened as Putin reasserts power asPresident.  Russia 
thus has both philosophical and practical objections to 
major action in Syria.  Additionally, China has renewed 
focus on protecting sovereignty.  An editorial in the People′s 
Dailyreferred to Libya as “a negative case study” (Garwood-
Gowers2012).  Russia and China have used a double veto in 
the Security Council to block even mild punishments for 
Syria.  India, South Africa and others also appear to have 
become more opposed to intervention as a result of events in 
Libya.  Indian U.N. representative Hardeep Singh Puri noted 
“the Libyan case has already given R2P a bad name” 
(Beauchamp 2012). 
 
The Western countries, too, are wary after Libya, so there 
has been much less discussion of using force.  When force 
was raised as an option in the U.S. Senate, military officials 
responded by explaining why military operations in Syria 
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would be much more difficult than in Libya.  Pragmatic 
constraints, not the responsibility to protect civilians, carry 
the day. 
 
The previously discussed unresolved issues about 
R2Preemerged in discussions of Syria.  Great focus has been 
put on sovereignty.  Russia’s Lavrov has argued, “We never 
said President Assad remaining in power is the solution to 
the crisis. What we did say is that it is up to the Syrians 
themselves to decide how to run their country” (“Russia 
Won’t” 2012).Lavrov also has noted that, “regime change is 
not our profession” (MacFarquhar 2012).  Further, Russia 
and China have been hesitant to pass resolutions with any 
mention of punishment for fear that the process will end in 
calls for force and regime change.  Ruan Zongze, vice 
president of the China Institute of International Studies, 
argued that Libya shows R2P “proved nothing more than the 
pursuit of hegemony in the name of humanity” (2012).  The 
Libyan case therefore seems to have sensitized key players to 
such a point that major R2P action seems highly unlikely. 
 
The Syria case also shows the ongoing issues around who 
can authorize action.  In this case, the vetoes of Russian and 
China have blocked action.  More subtly, the threat of vetoes 
has led to repeated efforts to waterdown resolutions, for 
example by taking out any mention of the word sanctions.  
This reinforces the fact that, with current U.N. rules, future 
R2P resolutions are likely to be blocked, or to be so toothless 
that they put little additional pressure on states.  Frustrated 
with the Security Council stalemate, those wanting action 
turned to the General Assembly.  In February 2012, the 
General Assembly supported a resolution condemning 
human rights violations and calling for Assad to step down.  
The vote was 137-12 with 17 abstentions.  The General 
Assembly resolution explicitly built off the ideas of the Arab 
League, another instance ofregional groups becoming active 
in pushing for internal reforms.  Neither the General 
Assembly nor the Arab League, though,hasbeen able to 
convince Assad to end the violence or consider stepping 
down.  These resolutions also have not convinced Russia or 
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China to change their stance.  General Assembly resolutions 
can indicate global preferences, but R2P actions depend on 
the politics of the Security Council.  R2P supporters like 
Canada’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axelworthy 
have returned to arguing for reform of U.N. vetoes, but this 
will surely fall on deaf ears yet again (Axelworthy 2012). 
 
Overall, it appears that if R2P is not dead, it is on life 
support.  R2P prevention efforts may continue, although it is 
not clear that these efforts really need the term R2P to move 
forward.  On the more dramatic idea of R2P interventions, 
key issues have never been resolved and recent events have 
only highlighted these issues and heightened critics’ fears.  
The terms have changed from humanitarian intervention to 
R2P, but the debates are largely the same.  In the wake of 
the Libyan case, interventions are likely to dwindle much as 
they did for the first decade of the 21st century following the 
backlash against the humanitarian interventions of the 
1990s. 
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